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NOTES
AN UNCERTAIN PARTICIPANT: VICTIM INPUT
AND THE BLACK BOX OF DISCRETIONARY
PAROLE RELEASE
Noah Epstein*
Little is understood about the parole release process, as state parole
boards predominately operate with incredible discretion and keep their
deliberations and rationales hidden from public view. Even less is
understood about the intersection of the inscrutable parole release
decision-making process and victim rights. As the victim rights movement
mobilized in the 1970s, victims, instead of remaining passive witnesses, came
to wield significant influence over the release decision process. Today,
victim participation in parole proceedings is increasing as most parole
boards proclaim how important victims’ voices are and, in turn, actively
incorporate victim input into their release calculus.
Yet, it is not entirely clear what role, if any, victims should have in the
release process because it is not entirely clear what purposes parole release
should serve more generally. Rather than resolving these pressing questions
that are at the heart of the release decision, the current system gives
individual parole board members a great degree of discretion when it comes
to how they approach victim input and the role it should serve. This
approach has resulted in a release process that treats victim input in a
troubling and inconsistent manner, which is unfair to inmates, victims, and
parole board members alike.
To make sense of this situation, this Note identifies four analytical
frameworks for understanding discretionary parole release, which reveal
board members’ options for approaching victim input. Ultimately, this Note
proposes that parole boards should approach the release decision as an
evaluation of both the inmate’s rehabilitation and the extent to which
sentencing’s retributive and deterrent goals have been met. In this vein,
victim input should only influence the release decision if it provides
information, not emotion, that the inmate is not rehabilitated or that the
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2018, Colgate University.
I extend my sincere gratitude to Professor Bruce A. Green not only for his superb guidance
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judge’s minimum sentence did not accurately reflect the impact of the crime
and that retribution or deterrence has not been met. In recognition of the
implications of such an approach, this Note proposes procedural changes to
the release decision and structural changes to parole boards. These
recommended reforms are animated by principles of equity, transparency,
and procedural justice. Applying this Note’s approach to victim input in the
parole process and implementing the corresponding procedural changes can
hopefully create a system that is fairer for inmates, minimizes risks of
secondary harms to victims, and protects board members from improper
external pressures.
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INTRODUCTION
What role should victims play in the parole release process? To what
degree is their input relevant to the purposes of discretionary parole release
as varied as those purposes may be?
These pressing questions came to the fore on March 13, 2018, when the
New York State Board of Parole (“the Board”) controversially granted parole
for Herman Bell, reopening old and deep wounds for some victims and
finally achieving closure for others.1 In 1979, Bell, a member of the Black
Liberation Army at the time of the crime,2 was sentenced to twenty-five years
to life imprisonment for the murder of two police officers, Joseph A.
Piagentini and Waverly M. Jones, in Harlem, New York, on May 21, 1971.3
In 2018, in preparation for Bell’s eighth and final parole hearing, Diane
Piagentini, the widow of Officer Piagentini, submitted her final written
victim impact statement,4 which the Board was required to consider under
New York law.5 Arguing against Bell’s release, Diane Piagentini detailed
the devastating emotional toll that the crime inflicted on her and her two
daughters, as well as the resulting post-traumatic stress disorder she
suffered.6
Conversely, the children of Officer Jones—Waverly Jones Jr. and Wanda
Jones—had advocated for Bell’s release.7 Their position was made clear in
a separate victim impact statement submitted in 2018, likely penned by
Waverly Jones Jr.8 The letter, as cited by the Board in the release decision,
stated, “The simple answer is [Bell’s release] would bring joy and peace as
we have already forgiven [him] publicly . . . . [T]o deny him parole again

1. See Al Baker, Man Who Killed 2 Officers in ‘71 Is Released From Prison, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/nyregion/herman-bell-parole.html
[https://perma.cc/59EJ-ZNU6].
2. The Black Liberation Army was an underground offshoot of the Black Panther Party
and was known for using radical and violent methods to achieve its political goals. For further
reading on the Black Liberation Army, see William Rosenau, “Our Backs Are Against the
Wall”: The Black Liberation Army and Domestic Terrorism in 1970s America, 36 STUD.
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 176 (2013).
3. See Baker, supra note 1.
4. See Piagentini v. N.Y. Bd. of Parole, 176 A.D.3d 138, 139–40 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019).
5. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(v) (McKinney 2021).
6. See Piagentini, 176 A.D.3d at 139–40 (discussing details articulated in Diane
Piagentini’s statement to the parole board), appeal denied, 35 N.Y.3d 906 (2020).
7. See Austin Fenner & Brian Harmon, Slain Cop’s Kin Urge Release of One Killer,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 4, 2004), https://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/slain-kinurge-release-killer-article-1.657766 [https://perma.cc/SPA7-J6FV]. However, not all of
Officer Jones’s family members advocated for the release of those involved in his death. See
Daniel A. Gross, The Eleventh Parole Hearing of Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, NEW YORKER
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-eleventh-parole-hearing-ofjalil-abdul-muntaqim [https://perma.cc/C8NG-KCSQ].
8. Although the victim impact statement was anonymous, every indication suggests that
it was submitted by Waverly Jones Jr. See Al Baker, Nearly 5 Decades Later, Man Who Killed
New York Officers Wins Parole, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
03/14/nyregion/herman-bell-nypd-parole.html [https://perma.cc/5QRP-8HWQ]; Piagentini,
176 A.D.3d at 148 (Egan, J., dissenting).
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would cause us pain as we are reminded of the painful episode each time he
appears before the board.”9
Ultimately, the Board voted two-to-one to release Bell over Diane
Piagentini’s objections,10 a deviation from the common trend.11 The Board
cited Bell’s remorse, strong support network, and exemplary disciplinary
record while incarcerated in support of its decision.12 The Board also directly
cited the victim letter and described it as a noteworthy factor in its release
decision but did not directly address Diane Piagentini’s victim impact
statement.13
The blowback to the Board’s decision was swift, as opponents decried the
decision as both disgraceful to victims14 and illegal because it did not
adequately assess Diane Piagentini’s victim statement.15 Some called for the
removal of the Board members who voted to release Bell.16 New York City
Mayor Bill de Blasio, in a letter to the Board, urged the Board to rescind its
decision arguing Bell’s release would cause too much anguish for the
victims’ families and questioned whether those who murder officers should
ever be released on parole.17 As recently as September 2020, in response to
Bell’s release and other controversial Board decisions,18 some New York
State lawmakers have proposed legislation that would permit the removal of
Board members upon a majority vote of the legislature, arguing such political

9. See Baker, supra note 8.
10. See id.
11. See infra Part I.D.2 (describing multiple studies, which reveal that victim participation
is highly correlated with release denials).
12. See Baker, supra note 1; see also Jen Marlowe, After Nearly 45 Years of
Incarceration, Herman Bell Wins Parole, COLORLINES (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.colorlines.com/articles/after-nearly-45-years-incarceration-herman-bell-winsparole [https://perma.cc/4V33-A4UV].
13. See Piagentini, 176 A.D.3d at 148 (Egan, J., dissenting); see also Baker, supra
note 8.
14. See Tina Moore et al., Law Enforcement Rages over Cop Killer’s Parole, N.Y. POST
(Mar. 14, 2018, 2:09 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/03/14/law-enforcement-rages-over-copkillers-parole/ [https://perma.cc/5WFV-6ZCH]; see also Press Release, New York City Police
Dep’t, The Truth About Herman Bell (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/
f0420/the-truth-herman-bell#/0 [https://perma.cc/5XPP-VH92] (“The Parole Board has
indeed sent a message in releasing him, though the families of Joseph Piagentini [and]
Waverly Jones . . . may not agree that it is positive or hopeful.”).
15. See Piagentini, 176 A.D.3d at 148 (Egan, J., dissenting).
16. See Families, PBA Outraged over Parole for Cop Killer Herman Bell, ABC7 N.Y.
(Mar. 15, 2018), https://abc7ny.com/parole-board-herman-bell-killing-nypd-pba-patrolmenbenevolent-association/3220591/ [https://perma.cc/NMG6-Z7YS].
17. Letter from Bill de Blasio, Mayor of the City of New York, to Tina M. Stanford,
Chairwoman of the New York State Bd. of Parole (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/
assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/parole-board-letter-bell.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P479-86S4].
18. See, e.g., Dorian Geiger, Killer and Rapist Who Admitted Brutal Double Murder Was
Motivated by Hatred of Women Controversially Paroled in NY, OXYGEN (Sept. 3, 2020,
2:45 PM), https://www.oxygen.com/crime-news/sam-ayala-convicted-of-double-murderand-rape-of-2-women-in-1977-paroled [https://perma.cc/C8UV-UBS4] (noting that one of
the victim’s children described the release as a mockery and argued that the release victimized
them again).
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accountability is necessary to ensure the Board adequately considers victims’
wishes in its deliberations.19
While victim input is only one of many factors that the typical parole
board20 considers,21 the case of Herman Bell highlights just how central a
role victims occupy in the parole process both in the public imagination and
in practice.22 More fundamentally, given the Board’s apparent reliance on
one victim’s statement over another, and the intense public blowback as a
result, Bell’s case reveals that it is not clear how release decisions should be
made and what the proper role for victims should be in that process. Further,
Bell’s case is not an outlier, as recent similar cases have occurred that prompt
the same questions. On August 27, 2021, a two-member panel of California
parole board members recommended that Sirhan B. Sirhan be released on
parole after appearing before board members sixteen times and spending over
fifty years in jail for the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.23 As
in Herman Bell’s case, there were victims who advocated for24 and against
release.25 While the panel recommendation could still be reviewed by the
full Board as well as reversed by California Governor Gavin Newsom,26 it
again showcases the centrality of victims in the process, at least from the
public’s perspective, and begs the question of how victims ought to fit into
that process. Rather than resolving these important questions, the current
system across many states gives parole boards great discretion when it comes
19. Bernadette Hogan, GOP State Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Strengthen Parole Board
Oversight, N.Y. POST (Sept. 29, 2020, 6:01 AM), https://nypost.com/2020/09/29/state-gopintroduces-bill-to-strengthen-parole-board-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/XT2Q-BS6F].
20. For the sake of uniformity, this Note refers to the institution in charge of discretionary
parole release as “boards” throughout, even though some states refer to their boards by
different names.
21. See EBONY L. RUHLAND ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., THE
CONTINUING LEVERAGE OF RELEASING AUTHORITIES: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 26
(2017),
https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/final_national_
parole_survey_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP5X-M76E] (reporting that states considered
victim input but also consider up to eighteen other factors).
22. For further discussion on just how central a role victims can play in the parole process,
see infra Part I.D.2.
23. See Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Parole Board Recommends Release of Sirhan Sirhan,
Robert F. Kennedy’s Assassin, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/08/27/us/sirhan-sirhan-parole-rfk.html [https://perma.cc/BA6H-EVBU].
24. See id. (detailing that one of Mr. Kennedy’s sons, Douglas Kennedy, attended the
hearing, pushed for release, and stated “I do have some love for you” while, another son,
Robert F. Kennedy Jr., sent the board a letter arguing for Mr. Sirhan’s release).
25. See Rory Kennedy, Opinion, Robert Kennedy Was My Dad. His Assassin Doesn’t
Deserve Parole., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/01/
opinion/sirhan-sirhan-parole-kennedy.html [https://perma.cc/UNX7-A7HD]; see also Ray
Sanchez & Cheri Mossburg, Board Recommends Parole For RFK Assassin Sirhan Sirhan on
16th Attempt, CNN (Aug. 28, 2021, 1:24 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/27/us/sirhansirhan-parole-rfk-assassination/index.html [https://perma.cc/8BJV-URKS]. Six of Kennedy’s
children issued a statement, which read, in part: “Our father’s death is a very difficult matter
for us to discuss publicly and for the past many decades we have declined to engage directly
in the parole process . . . . We adamantly oppose the parole and release of Sirhan Sirhan and
are shocked by a ruling that we believe ignores the standards for parole of a confessed,
first-degree murderer in the state of California.” Id.
26. See Bogel-Burroughs, supra note 23.
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to how they approach victim input and consider the purposes it should
serve.27 This has created a system that produces inconsistent and troubling
results, which is unfair to inmates, victims, and parole board members
alike.28
This Note offers a proposal for the way victim input should be evaluated
in the parole release context. It argues that the release decision should be
approached as a quasi-judicial act concerned only with the rehabilitation of
the inmate and whether the retributive and deterrent principles of sentencing
have been met.29 It then concludes that victim input should only influence
the release decision if it provides information, other than emotion, that
demonstrates either that the inmate is not rehabilitated, or that the sentencing
judge’s minimum sentence did not accurately reflect the impact of the crime,
and thus the needs of retribution and deterrence have not been met.30
To compensate for the implications of this proposal, this Note:
(1) proposes that states clarify and codify the proper role of victim input in
parole release decisions and (2) urges state legislatures to implement
institutional changes to their parole boards and procedural changes to release.
Such reforms are necessary to both prevent parole boards from being overly
retributive- or deterrence-focused, which can lead to a crush of denials, and
to better protect victims from secondary harms.
Part I of this Note examines the function and history of discretionary
parole release in the United States and the way it has intersected with victim
rights to demonstrate the current influence of victim participation on parole
release. Part II explores the ambiguous purpose that victim input serves in
parole release decision-making and the way it results in inconsistent
treatment of victim input. Drawing on theory and practice, it describes four
analytical frameworks for understanding how parole boards make release
decisions and how each approach treats victim input differently. Part III
posits that release decisions should be approached as a form of resentencing
that is concerned only with the inmate’s rehabilitation and the goals of
sentencing. Thus, this Note concludes that victim input should only be
relevant to the release decision if it speaks to these two elements.
Furthermore, Part III proposes procedural and institutional reforms necessary
to implement this approach.
I. VICTIMS IN THE PAROLE HEARING ROOM
This part provides a brief history of discretionary parole release in the
United States, how it functions today, and how it has intersected with the
victim rights movement. In addition, it discusses the level of influence that
victim input has had on the release decision in practice.

27.
28.
29.
30.

See infra notes 53–63 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.D.2.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
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A. Discretionary Parole Release in the United States: A Turbulent History
Parole traces its roots in the United States back to 1876, when it was first
implemented at the New York State Reformatory for Juveniles in Elmira
(“Elmira”).31 In response to the old penological system’s failure to achieve
rehabilitation, Elmira instituted indeterminate sentencing, in which an inmate
could “work out his own salvation” and then be granted conditional
supervised release if deemed fit.32 This innovation, commonly known as
parole, aimed to foster and achieve rehabilitation.33 Further, it incentivized
good behavior among the prison population,34 reduced overcrowding in
prisons,35 and reduced prison expenses dramatically.36 In fact, the Supreme
Court in Morrissey v. Brewer37 stated that the “purpose [of parole] is to help
individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they
are able . . . . It also serves to alleviate the costs to society of keeping an
individual in prison.”38
The Elmira approach proved popular,39 and by 1922, practically every
state implemented an indeterminate sentencing regime whereby a judge
would sentence an individual to a minimum and maximum term of
imprisonment and then the parole board would assess when to grant that
individual supervised parole release within that range.40 In this sense, the
judiciary and parole board worked together to determine a criminal
defendant’s true period of incarceration.
Then, between the 1970s and the 1990s, states moved toward greater
determinacy in sentencing, in which a judge determined very closely the
exact release date through sentencing, and the parole board’s release
authority was heavily curtailed.41 This was, in part, due to a rising “tough on
crime” movement that viewed as suspect rehabilitation as an underlying
principle of parole.42 Additionally, there was concern among the public and

31. See NEIL P. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 15
(2d ed. 1983).
32. See Alexander W. Pisciotta, Scientific Reform: The “New Penology” at Elmira,
1876–1900, 29 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 613, 616 (1983).
33. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing
to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 499 (2008).
34. See id. at 499–500.
35. See Dashka Slater, Can You Talk Your Way Out of a Life Sentence, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/01/magazine/prison-parole-california.html
[https://perma.cc/7W4Z-JHV7].
36. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 31, at 20; see also Kevin R. Reitz, Prison-Release
Reform and American Decarceration, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2741, 2751 (2020).
37. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
38. Id. at 477.
39. Id. (discussing that, since 1912, parole “has become an integral part of the penological
system”).
40. See Slater, supra note 35.
41. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 9.
42. See id. (detailing how the public’s desire for greater severity in sentencing and the
difficulty of determining when one was rehabilitated led to decreased support for parole
among legislators, scholars, and the public).
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state legislatures over a lack of transparency in the parole release process.43
Thus, states eschewed the rehabilitative ideals of indeterminacy and turned
toward stiffer determined sentences.44 This change in the tides led nearly
twenty states to abolish their parole regimes or limit the scope of their boards’
discretion and culminated with the federal government’s abolition of federal
parole with the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.45
Despite these setbacks, discretionary parole release has witnessed a
renewed interest,46 reassuming its place as a crucial element in the U.S.
criminal justice system.47 The majority of states today have indeterminate
sentencing regimes, in which the state parole boards retain discretionary
release authority,48 and other states have boards that retain discretionary
release authority over specific inmate populations.49 In fact, at least 187,052
inmates were granted discretionary release in the United States in 2016.50
Due to budget constraints and worsening prison overcrowding, many
scholars and prison officials have concluded that discretionary parole is
likely to grow in prominence, as it has proven to effectively reduce prison
overcrowding.51 Some prominent U.S. senators have even begun to explore
reestablishing federal parole.52

43. See id.; see also Jennifer Gonnerman, Prepping for Parole, NEW YORKER
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/12/02/prepping-for-parole
[https://perma.cc/63XR-5GZV] (discussing how an official state investigation in New York
in the 1970s found that the “decisions of the parole board are fraught with the appearance of
arbitrariness”).
44. See Medwed, supra note 33, at 501.
45. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 and 28 U.S.C.).
46. See Edward E. Rhine et al., The Future of Parole Release, 46 CRIME & JUST. 279, 280
(2017) (“At least one state, Mississippi, recently expanded its parole granting function . . . .
Others are considering restoring parole release as part of a larger program to lower
incarceration rates.”).
47. See Medwed, supra note 33, at 503 (stating that the population under parole
supervision has tripled from 1980 to 2000).
48. See Reitz, supra note 36, at 2742; see also Edward E. Rhine et al., Parole Boards
Within Indeterminate and Determinate Sentencing Structures, ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. &
CRIM. JUST. (Apr. 3, 2018), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/news-views/parole-boards-withinindeterminate-and-determinate-sentencing-structures
[https://perma.cc/FA59-K9VE]
(detailing that 34 states still have discretionary release authority within an indeterminate
sentencing regime).
49. See Rhine et al., supra note 48 (explaining that these specific inmate populations are
those serving life terms and/or those who committed crimes prior to the passage of the
determinate sentencing system).
50. DANIELLE KAEBLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2016, at 20 (2016).
51. See Medwed, supra note 33, at 504. But see Reitz, supra note 36, at 2745–50 (arguing
that discretionary release is in part to blame for rising prison populations, but if managed
better, discretionary release can in fact reduce prison overcrowding more effectively than other
methods).
52. See Rory Fleming, Lindsey Graham Remarks Offer Hope for Reinstatement of Federal
Parole, FILTER MAG. (Nov. 21, 2019), https://filtermag.org/lindsey-graham-federal-parole/
[https://perma.cc/4H9W-CE3X].
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Yet, criticisms of discretionary parole release remain because board
decision-making processes are likened to an inscrutable “black box,”53 as the
process for the decision-making is not so transparent.54 This is principally
due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,55 which held that inmates have
no liberty interest in the parole release process and thus are afforded no due
process rights therein unless the parole system of a given state specifically
grants such an interest.56 For example, a liberty interest is created when the
state statute governing parole provides that a state shall release an inmate if
certain factors are met.57 However, even in cases in which such a liberty
interest is established, the due process afforded is still minimal. In
Greenholtz, the Court held that Nebraska’s parole system had created a
liberty interest in release but that the board satisfied due process because it
provided the inmate with an opportunity to be heard and a brief description,
with no corroborating evidence, of how he fell short of qualifying for parole
release.58 In its ruling, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s requirement
that the Nebraska parole board give “a full and fair explanation, in writing,
of the essential facts relied upon and the reasons for denial of parole.”59
Further, the Court held that states can be general in how they define the
factors parole boards should consider in their release determinations to afford
themselves wide latitude in making these “‘equity’ type judgment[s] that
cannot always be articulated in traditional findings.”60
Therefore, in the current landscape, due process protections do not attach
to the parole release process unless a state explicitly says they do, and parole
boards are afforded broad discretion to determine how to weigh the multiple
factors at their disposal.61 Further, boards need not carefully explain the
rationales underlying their decisions.62 This has had the effect of
discouraging inmate appeals of release decisions, as courts and
administrative review are highly deferential to board decisions.63 Thus, to
better understand discretionary release, one must examine the
decision-making process in practice.

53. RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 10.
54. See id. at 9, 33 (highlighting that 41 percent of parole boards never even make public
their rationale for a denial).
55. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
56. See id. at 1, 7, 11–12.
57. See id. at 11–12.
58. See id. at 13, 16.
59. See Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex v. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274, 1285
(8th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
60. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8, 13.
61. See id.
62. See id.; see also Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 315 n.44 (finding that when rationales
are required for parole decisions, boilerplate explanations are more than sufficient to satisfy
judicial review of release decisions).
63. See, e.g., Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 315–16.
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B. To Release or Not to Release?: How the Decision Is Made
This section discusses the typical parole decision-making process and the
structure of parole boards and examines the release factors considered at
release hearings.
1. The Members of the Board
While each state has developed its own parole system, the basic approach
to parole release is rather uniform across the United States.64 Most state
parole boards are made up of fewer than a dozen members, with only
approximately 350 board members nationwide.65 The governor of a state
typically appoints members to the board,66 and board members can be
removed as easily as they are appointed.67 Accordingly, the board is
principally politically accountable.68
On the whole, parole board members “enjoy low professional status, high
job insecurity, and no insulation from media and political reprisals” when
release decisions go wrong.69 In fact, parole boards themselves cite political
vulnerabilities, such as the threat of job loss or political retaliation for an
unpopular decision and the pressure to limit risk, as the greatest problems
they face.70 Coinciding with this vulnerability, there are few required
credentials for appointment to a parole board—educational,
experience-based, or otherwise.71 The eligibility requirements in the states
that do have formal requirements are often vague and open-ended, and the
expectations for knowledge or expertise are low.72 Thus, a consistent source
of criticism for boards nationwide is that board members lack the credentials
needed for the complex job with which they are tasked.73
2. The Parole Hearing Process
The parole hearing is an administrative hearing to determine whether an
inmate should be released from prison to conditional supervision. Statutes
that describe when an inmate is suitable for release are often written in
general terms, which provide boards with significant discretion regarding
64. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 10–14.
65. Reitz, supra note 36, at 2743.
66. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 18.
67. Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 286.
68. See Alejo Rodriguez, The Obscure Legacy of Mass Incarceration: Parole Board
Abuses of People Serving Parole Eligible Life Sentences, 22 CUNY L. REV. F. 33, 52–53
(2019) (documenting former New York Governor George Pataki’s capricious political
influence on parole decisions).
69. Reitz, supra note 36, at 2748–49.
70. See id. at 2750; see also KALEENA J. BURKES ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM.
JUST., RELEASING AUTHORITY CHAIRS: A COMPARATIVE SNAPSHOT ACROSS THREE DECADES
20
(2017),
https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/
parole_chairs_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BBA-DC2Y].
71. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 286.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 286–88.
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their assessment of individual cases.74 Common principles underlying parole
release are: (1) recidivism (i.e. whether there is a reasonable probability the
inmate will violate the law again),75 (2) whether release is compatible with
the welfare of society, and (3) whether release would devalue the seriousness
of the crime for which the inmate was convicted.76
Further, there is overwhelming consensus on the release criteria
considered by states.77 Those most commonly considered by parole boards
are divided among: (1) static factors, which an inmate cannot change during
their period of incarceration; (2) dynamic factors, which account for the
inmate’s behavior while in prison; and (3) opinion factors proffered by third
parties.78 The most important static factors are the nature of the underlying
offense and the inmate’s prior criminal record.79 Dynamic factors include
the inmate’s prison program participation, disciplinary record while
incarcerated, and importantly, the inmate’s demeanor and testimony at the
actual parole hearing.80 As for opinion factors (in essence, input from
interested third parties), victim input is the one factor that is nearly
universally assessed.81 Every state permits written victim impact statements
and nearly every state allows victims to provide in-person testimony.82
Further, beyond simply permitting this input, thirty-nine of forty responding
parole boards stated in a survey that they do factor victim input into their
release decision-making processes.83
All these factors are contemplated at the parole hearing. The hearing, in
popular imagination and often in practice, consists of a panel of board
members who make a release decision after a discussion with the inmate.84
74. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (McKinney 2021) (“Discretionary release
on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance
of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such
inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness
of his crime as to undermine respect for law.”).
75. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 23–27 (discussing risk assessment tools parole
boards rely on, as well as board members’ own views of risk of recidivism, as important
factors).
76. Many systems prohibit release if release: (1) would substantially depreciate the
seriousness of the crime, (2) is incompatible with the welfare of society, or (3) undermines
respect for the law. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (McKinney 2021); see also
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125 (2021) (requiring that release not be incompatible with the welfare
of society). In addition, some states task boards with weighing the sufficiency of time served
or severity of the offense. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 42-9-40(a) (2021); TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 508.144(a)(2) (2021).
77. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 25.
78. See id. at 26.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 25.
81. See Sarah French Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole
Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 400, 404–05 (2014) (finding that of
the 45 states that responded to a 2012 survey, all indicated they consider victim input).
82. See id. at 400–05; see also RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 28.
83. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 26 (finding that 97.5 percent of responding
states consider victim input).
84. See id. at 32–34; see also Slater, supra note 35.
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The reality, though not terribly far off, differs by state based on the twin
constraints of time and resources.85 The interview with the inmate is
synonymous with the hearing in a majority of states, and most often board
members themselves conduct the interview and make a release decision soon
afterward.86 These interviews are often in-person, but they can also be done
via phone or video conference.87 However, victims also play a role at these
hearings. When there is a hearing in which both board members and the
inmate are present, roughly half of states allow for victim testimony at the
hearing.88 Some allow victims to be present but not to speak, while others
do not allow victims to be present at all.89
Typically, a panel of board members presides over the release hearing and
can grant release only upon a majority vote.90 Inmates have a limited ability
to appeal or challenge the decision. Some states permit parole boards to deny
release and force the inmate to serve the maximum sentence with no
possibility of future release.91 Most states allow for an appeal pursuant to
either statute or administrative policy, but some states do not even entitle
inmates to appeal a parole denial.92 And, given Greenholtz, it is very difficult
to overturn a parole denial, as courts are highly deferential to the parole
boards’ broad discretion.93 However, even in the absence of meaningful
appeal, most inmates do have recourse in that they are given periodic
reconsideration for parole release, often once every two years,94 unless the
parole board has disqualified them from periodic review.95
Lastly, the depth of consideration a parole board dedicates to an individual
inmate during the release process varies considerably. In Colorado, for
example, studies have revealed what is termed a “conveyor belt” approach to
parole decisions, in which cases are handled in mere minutes.96 On the other
hand, in California, the process can be incredibly long, personal, and

85. See Beth Schwartzapfel, How Parole Boards Keep Prisoners in the Dark and Behind
Bars, WASH. POST (July 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/the-power-andpolitics-of-parole-boards/2015/07/10/49c1844e-1f71-11e5-84d5-eb37ee8eaa61_story.html
[https://perma.cc/5JBS-EEKK].
86. See Russell, supra note 81, at 400–01.
87. See id. In New Jersey, an administrative hearing officer interviews the inmate, who
writes recommendations to a panel of board members; the inmate subsequently has an
additional interview with a panel of board members who then make a release decision.
Division of Release, N.J. STATE PAROLE BD., https://www.nj.gov/parole/
functions/release-division/ [https://perma.cc/F9JZ-NDN7] (Sept. 9, 2021).
88. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 29 (finding that twenty-three of forty
responding states permit victims to be present and speak at a parole hearing that is also
attended by the inmate).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 30.
91. See id. at 33.
92. See id.
93. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979).
94. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 31, at 21–22.
95. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
96. See Medwed, supra note 33, at 510.
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draining, as board members can interrogate inmates for hours,97 and victims
can speak at length about the impact the crime has had on them.98 On the
whole, however, parole boards are severely limited in the amount of time
they can afford to review each individual case.99
3. How the Factors Are Assessed
While there is a great degree of uniformity in the factors parole boards
assess in their decision-making processes, there is less unanimity in weighing
a particular factor. As an initial matter, it is hard to know how factors are
given weight because more than two-thirds of parole boards do not publicize
their deliberations.100 In addition, sixteen states do not even publish their
rationale for a denial.101 Further, some boards’ explanations of their release
decisions are hardly informative, as their rationales are often short one-line
sentences that can be unrevealing; for example, “The Board concludes that
you should serve more of your sentence prior to release on parole.”102
However, drawing from a survey of twenty-nine individual board
members, a somewhat clearer picture begins to form. The “first tier”
factors—the most important factors—were the “nature” or “severity” of the
underlying crime and any other criminal record of the inmate eligible for
parole.103 The “second tier” factors represented inmate conduct while
incarcerated and were reflected in program participation, disciplinary
records, and other actuarial tools that determine risk.104 The “third tier”
factors were opinion factors, including inmate testimony as the most
important and sentencing judge input, prosecutor input, and the offender’s
family input as even less important.105 There was one notable exception to
the trend that opinion factors are the least important: victim input.106 In fact,
the importance of victim input has increased dramatically over time relative
to other opinion factors.107 The importance of victim input to the release
decision traces the rise of the victim rights movement, which calls for greater
involvement of victims in all aspects of the criminal justice process.

97. See Kathryne M. Young, Parole Hearings and Victims’ Rights: Implementation,
Ambiguity, and Reform, 49 CONN. L. REV. 431, 444–45 (2016); see also Slater, supra note 35.
98. See Young, supra note 97, at 457.
99. See Reitz, supra note 36, at 2750 n.26 (describing that some board members have
between three and twenty minutes to make a release decision).
100. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 29.
101. Id. at 33.
102. See, e.g., VIRGINIA PAROLE BOARD, PAROLE DECISIONS FOR OCTOBER 2020,
WITH
REASONS
(2020),
https://vpb.virginia.gov/files/1185/vpb-decisions-oct20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8CE-V7EV].
103. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 26–27.
104. Id. at 27.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. BURKES ET AL., supra note 70, at 23–24.
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C. The Victim Rights Movement and Parole
Prior to the 1970s, the prosecutorial goal to convict defined the extent of
victim involvement in the criminal justice system.108 The interest in the
concept of victim rights gained traction with the publication of the seminal
Final Report of the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime in 1982,
which noted that the current criminal justice system “burdened” rather than
protected crime victims.109 The report spawned a movement that pushed
successfully for greater victim involvement in all aspects of the criminal
justice system, from sentencing to parole.110
The movement sought to prevent the distinct problem of secondary
victimization—in which the government’s lack of care toward the victim
inflicts harm beyond that of the original crime111—and impress on judges
and prosecutors that behind the state are people with their own interests.112
Victims’ interests include having a voice in the process, maintaining their
dignity and respect, and healing after the underlying crime, which
collectively can reduce feelings of helplessness and disillusionment with the
justice system.113
However, there are different approaches to realizing those specific
interests. One is for the state to afford victims an instrumental role with direct
influence on the punishment process itself.114 Another is to provide victims
an expressive role, whereby victims have an opportunity to share their
experience for cathartic and therapeutic purposes even though their
testimony would not impact the decision.115 For both approaches, procedural
justice theorists have posited that an evaluation of a decision’s fairness is not
based solely on the outcome but rather on the process by which the decision

108. See Young, supra note 97, at 435.
109. LOIS HAIGHT HERRINGTON ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON
VICTIMS OF CRIME 76, 114 (1982), https://ovc.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh226/files/media/
document/87299.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS63-MN9G].
110. See Young, supra note 97, at 435–39.
111. See DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON 30–31 (2019).
112. See Kathryn Morgan & Brent L. Smith, Victims, Punishment, and Parole: The Effect
of Victim Participation on Parole Hearings, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 333, 335–36
(2005).
113. See Paul H. Robinson, Should the Victims’ Rights Movement Have Influence over
Criminal Law Formulation and Adjudication?, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 749, 758 (2002); see
also Lara Bazelon & Bruce A. Green, Victims’ Rights from a Restorative Perspective, 17 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 293, 299–301 (2020).
114. See Morgan & Smith, supra note 112, at 336. But see Robinson, supra note 113, at
755–57 (challenging the propriety of such schemes, as direct victim influence causes a host of
problems given that victims are not impartial and can contribute to disparities in punishment
since some want more lenient sentences and others push for harsher sentences).
115. See Robinson, supra note 113, at 755–57. Additionally, in the parole context, some
states offer victims post-conviction opportunities to meet with their offender to discuss their
feelings and other questions they may have to make sense of the crime. See Victim Offender
Dialogue, MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., https://mn.gov/doc/victims/restorative-justice/victiminitiated-restorative-practices/victim-offender-dialogue/
[https://perma.cc/UW8X-KKHF]
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
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was reached.116 If the process itself is unfair, victims may question the
legitimacy of the proceedings and find themselves revictimized.117
However, if the process is fair, it can provide the victims with a positive
experience in which they are not revictimized, even if they ultimately
disagree with the final decision.118 To achieve such a process, these
procedural justice theorists argue the process must be fashioned to ensure
that: (1) victims can share their experiences, (2) the decision-maker is
neutral, (3) victims view the decision-maker as attentive and trustworthy, and
(4) victims are treated with respect throughout the process.119
While there are different ways to champion victim interests generally,
victims’ rights in the parole context have expanded dramatically such that
victim input at parole hearings is almost as common as it is at sentencing.120
Lobbying on behalf of victims has led parole boards to establish
much-needed victim services offices121 and to expand victim notification
systems to alert victims about any case developments.122 Rather than
relegate victims to an expressive role, many states provide victims an
instrumental role in the process by actively considering victim input when it
comes to the release decision.123 However, as the Herman Bell and Sirhan
B. Sirhan cases reveal, there is a real probability of parole boards
inconsistently treating victim input which can lead to unmet expectations for
victims and inmates alike.
D. The Dramatic Yet Inconsistent Effect of Victim Input
This section describes, first, what information victims provide and, second,
how victim input has affected the release decision since parole boards began
permitting their input.

116. Mary Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise: Procedural Justice, the
Crime Victims’ Rights Act, and the Victim’s Right to Be Reasonably Protected from the
Accused, 78 TENN. L. REV. 47, 85 (2010).
117. See id. at 86–92.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 90–91.
120. Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime Victim: Evaluating Victim Input at
Sentencing and Parole, 38 CRIME & JUST. 347, 382 (2009).
121. See, e.g., Victims’ Rights in the Parole Process, GA. STATE BD. OF PARDONS
& PAROLES, https://pap.georgia.gov/georgia-office-victim-services/victims-rights-paroleprocess [https://perma.cc/HKZ5-D424] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); Victims Services, STATE
OF IOWA BD. OF PAROLE, https://bop.iowa.gov/victim-services [https://perma.cc/U3E2-K57D]
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021); Victim Services: Information for Crime Victims, N.J. STATE
PAROLE BD., https://www.nj.gov/parole/functions/victim-services/ [https://perma.cc/K3428QTP] (May 24, 2021).
122. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 348, 383.
123. See supra Part I.B.2.
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1. What Are Victims Saying?
Most victims attend and submit testimony to oppose an inmate’s
release,124 but some victims advocate for release.125 Precisely what victims
say in their impact statements is not always known, as most states keep victim
input confidential.126 A select few states provide victim input to the inmate,
and a handful more provide the information to the inmate if it is disclosed in
a public hearing.127
The information victims provide either for or against release varies
considerably because states offer scant guidance to victims when they solicit
information from them. For example, many states explicitly ask victims for
their opinion on whether an inmate should be released but do not say if they
should offer specific evidence in support of their opinion.128 Parole boards
often encourage a subjective interpretation of relevance129 by asking victims
to share any information they would like the board to consider when making
its decision.130 In Alabama, for example, the board allows victims to be
present at an inmate’s parole hearing and give any reason whatsoever for why
an inmate should not be released.131 When being most specific, parole boards
ask victims to detail the continuing effects of the crime, such as financial loss
or inability to work, and other relevant information that would help the board
determine the likelihood an offender might commit a new crime upon
release.132
While little is known about the substance of these confidential victim
impact statements, in reality, victims only attend approximately 10 percent
of release hearings.133 Possible reasons for low attendance could be a desire
to avoid reliving crimes that are too painful, impracticability to attend, or
even a lack of interest.134 Interestingly, many California board members
believe the rate of victim attendance is higher (between 20 and 30 percent),
reflecting that victims’ participation likely looms large in some board

124. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 317.
125. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
126. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 29.
127. See id.
128. See Victims’ Rights in the Parole Process, supra note 121 (“The [victim] can object
to future parole and say why, or the writer can simply ask to be notified before any final parole
decision is made.”); see also Making a Statement: Victim Input into the Parole Process, PA.
OFF.
OF
THE
VICTIM
ADVOC.,
https://www.ova.pa.gov/Documents/
Making%20a%20Statement%20English.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZZP-PPXN] (stating that the
victim advocate at the direction of the victim can petition the board to deny parole).
129. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 388–89.
130. See id.
131. Victim Services Brochure, ALA. BUREAU OF PARDONS & PAROLES,
https://paroles.alabama.gov/victim-services/ [https://perma.cc/9B7T-LFS5] (last visited Sept.
17, 2021).
132. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 388 (discussing the approach to victim input in New
Jersey).
133. Young, supra note 97, at 456.
134. See id. at 480, 489.
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members’ minds.135 The next section discusses the precise effect victim
input has on the parole release process.
2. The Effect of Victim Input
Multiple studies have concluded that victim input can be—and often is—
a decisive factor in parole release decisions. The first empirical study on the
subject, conducted in 1994 in Pennsylvania, found that parole was denied at
a rate of 43 percent when victim testimony was presented, as opposed to a
rate of 7 percent when it was not.136 Although based on a small sample, this
1994 study pointed to an alarming phenomenon. Subsequent studies and
surveys have verified this finding, with one interview eliciting an
administrator of a board to comment that “where no victim impact statements
are available for board review, 40 to 50 percent of parole applications are
denied; where statements are submitted, the rate of parole denial rises sharply
to approximately 80 percent.”137 In addition, studies conducted in
Alabama138 and California139 found that when victims or their next of kin
testify at a parole hearing, board members are far less likely to grant
parole.140 The Alabama study found that written victim statements had a
profound impact on release—oral testimony even more so—and that victim
participation, in general, was the second-best predictor of a release denial.141
Additionally, inmates believe victims wield influence over the release
decision.142 One study “found that almost a third of parole board
interviewers believed that prisoners postponed or waived hearings because
of the likely presence of the victim.”143 In the same study, thirteen board
members also stated that victim presence has a negative impact on the inmate
as it could hamper their performance at the hearing.144 Perhaps, this fear

135. See id. at 456.
136. See William Parsonage et al., Victim Impact Testimony and Pennsylvania’s Parole
Decision-Making Process: A Pilot Study, 6 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 187, 194 (1992).
137. See Morgan & Smith, supra note 112, at 339.
138. See Brent L. Smith et al., The Effect of Victim Participation on Parole Decisions:
Results from a Southeastern State, 8 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 57, 71 (1997) (finding that victim
input is a highly significant predictor of parole decision-making in that the number of releases
decreases when victims participate in the process); see also Morgan & Smith, supra note 112,
at 354, 357 (“The more victim participation present relative to the offender, the more likely
that parole will be denied . . . . The more letters of protest in an offender’s file, the more
persons protesting at an offender’s hearing, the more likely that parole will be denied.”).
139. ROBERT WEISBERG ET AL., LIFE IN LIMBO: AN EXAMINATION OF PAROLE RELEASE FOR
PRISONERS SERVING LIFE SENTENCES WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA
5 (2011), https://law.stanford.edu/index.php?webauth-document=child-page/164096/doc/
slspublic/SCJC_report_Parole_Release_for_Lifers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SN3D-D26K]
(finding that the grant rate when victims attend is less than half the rate than when victims do
not attend).
140. See supra notes 138–39.
141. See Morgan & Smith, supra note 112, at 355–57.
142. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 317.
143. See id. at 317–18.
144. Kim Polowek, Victim Participatory Rights in Parole: Their Role and the Dynamics
of Victim Influence as Seen by Board Members 126–27 (2005) (Ph.D. dissertation,
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stems from the fact that parole boards are rarely forthcoming about their
reasons for denial145 and are known to avoid making controversial decisions,
such as releasing an inmate over a victim’s wishes.146
In addition, many board members perceive that victims have a profound
effect on the release decision-making process. A survey found that 40
percent of board members acknowledged that victim input was “very
influential” in decisions to grant or deny release.147 Another study found that
for 90 percent of fifty-two board members in the United States and Canada,
victim input had an impact on the release decision.148
Lastly, the visceral and emotional intensity of victim testimony appears to
influence board members toward denying release. In California, a state that
allows victim involvement but does not statutorily require boards to factor it
into their release decision-making processes,149 board members believe
victim testimony can subconsciously affect their decisions.150 One board
member stated it was easy to become mired in a victim’s sadness at these
hearings and that “[i]t does affect [them].”151 Another commented that
anyone who says otherwise—that victim presence does not have a heavy
emotional impact—is likely lying.152 One board member even stated that
victim involvement likely explains high turnover rates for parole board
members, as it is often so “emotional [and] gut wrenching.”153
In reiterating that victims appear to exert great influence on the release
process, one scholar, Julian V. Roberts, posits that victim participation exerts
a greater influence on parole release decisions than sentencing decisions.154
First, Roberts notes that the parole board has greater discretion than a
sentencing judge.155 Second, Roberts argues victims mainly use their voice
to seek parole denial, whereas in sentencing they have many other motives,
such as compensation.156 And, third, Roberts posits that board members are
more ill-suited to disregard prejudicial rather than probative information than
a professional judge157 because they often have nonlegal credentials and are
Simon
Frasier
University),
summit.sfu.ca/system/files/iritems1/10276/etd2042.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F7Z2-YSJ6].
145. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
146. See Reitz, supra note 36, at 2750; see also Schwartzapfel, supra note 85.
147. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 317.
148. Polowek, supra note 144, at 131–32 (finding that 13 assigned it “some influence,” 26
assigned it “moderate influence,” and 4 assigned it “substantial influence”).
149. Young, supra note 97, at 478 n.274 (detailing that no mandate exists in California
requiring board members to consider victim input in their release decisions). But see, e.g.,
Making Parole Decisions, PA. PAROLE BD., https://www.parole.pa.gov/Parole%20Process/
Making%20Parole%20Decisions/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7H6N-TNF5] (last
visited Sept. 17, 2021) (stating that Pennsylvania requires board members to factor victim
input into their release decision by law).
150. See Young, supra note 97, at 472 & n.240.
151. Id. at 460 (emphasis in original).
152. See id.
153. Id. at 461.
154. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 396–97.
155. See id. at 397.
156. See id. at 397–98.
157. Id. at 398.

2021]

AN UNCERTAIN PARTICIPANT

807

political appointees, making them more sensitive to public support for victim
rights.158
There is deep controversy regarding the fact that victim input can so
thoroughly influence the parole release decision. Some scholars of parole
have voiced deep skepticism regarding the propriety of victim influence over
the release decision, arguing their input adds no relevant information for
boards to consider when making release decisions.159 They argue that boards
should focus solely on whether an inmate is sufficiently rehabilitated for
release back into the community160 and that victim input almost never speaks
to this issue.161
In turn, board members have been receptive to these scholars’ arguments,
as 61 percent of those surveyed believe the most important factor in their
decision-making is an inmate’s likelihood of committing crimes upon
conditional release.162 As discussed above, this approach would leave little
room for victims to have a meaningful impact on the release calculus.
Further, there are many board members who think victim input is an
inappropriate factor to consider.163 In 1988, a survey found that 44 percent
of responding board members agreed that victims provide valuable input,
whereas 37 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that victims should even
be permitted to give such input.164 It is important to note that while there are
board members who push back against victim influence, victim input is
regarded as highly important by an even larger proportion of board members
today. A comparative survey from 2015 found that eighteen out of thirty-one
board members agreed or strongly agreed that victims offered valuable
information on the release decision, while only two strongly disagreed and
eleven expressed no opinion.165 Thus, while fewer board members disagree
about the propriety of victim influence over parole release, there are varied
approaches and inconsistencies among board members regarding how they
view the value of victim input.
These divergent approaches to victim testimony are further reflected by
the fact that the same California board members who described the emotional
toll of victim involvement on them166 almost unanimously stated that they
“rarely put much weight into it”167 because it is not a determinant for
suitability of release in their state.168 They stated that victims do not
influence their decisions because the inquiry is about the inmate’s risk of
recidivism, not the people whom the inmate hurt, and also “that not
158. See id.; see also Part I.B.1 (describing the general composition of parole boards).
159. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 386; see also Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 318.
160. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 385–86.
161. See id. at 347; see also Young, supra note 97, at 485–86.
162. BURKES ET AL., supra note 70, at 17–18.
163. Id. at 18.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text.
167. Young, supra note 97, at 473.
168. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 2281(c), 2402 (2021) (not delineating victims’ right
to speak as a factor for determining suitability for release).
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disregarding victims’ testimony would be unfair to the thousands of victims
who chose not to—or could not—come to the hearing.”169
That being said, the same board members uniformly support the
unrestricted participation of victims170 because it confers a procedural and
moral legitimacy on the hearings, keeps board members sensitive to victim
interests, and can be therapeutic for victims.171 Board members’ support for
victim participation, which they believe has no influence on their decision,
could also be attributed to the fact that it appears fundamentally wrong not to
allow victims to express their emotions when inmates who caused them such
distress might be released back into society.172 Thus, in California the
conundrum of uniformly supporting victim participation, while insisting they
have no influence on the release decision, largely relegates victims to an
expressive role that confers procedural integrity.173
Nonetheless, victim input appears to exert a dramatic impact on release
decisions in most jurisdictions. Empirical studies not only uniformly show
that victim input is a strong indicator of release denial but also that board
members and inmates themselves view the input as quite influential and, at
times, outcome-determinative. Moreover, the emotionally charged nature of
victim input makes it difficult for board members not to be influenced by
it.174 However, the degree to which victim input is valued is inconsistent, as
some jurisdictions and individual board members view victim influence on
the release decision as improper175 and, in turn, may accord it different
degrees of weight in their analyses.176 Yet, those very same board members
often view victim participation at the hearing as indispensable to the integrity
of the process, reflecting that even those who are skeptical believe there must
be some role for victims in the release process.177
Thus, it appears most parole boards believe victim input matters, yet there
is no consensus on exactly how it matters. The lack of clarity over the proper
role of victims in the release process is addressed in Part II, which explains
that the lack of clarity is a product of the fact that there are several approaches
to understanding parole and the purposes it serves and that each approach
treats victim input differently.

169. See Young, supra note 97, at 472–73 (emphasis in original).
170. Id. at 455–56. Also, in California, victim participation can become marathon hearings,
as victims can speak for hours often disrupting the schedule for parole hearings. See id. at
456–57.
171. But see id. at 475–76 (commenting that while participation can be therapeutic for
some, other board members viewed participation as preventing closure for victims, as they
feed on hate for the inmate rather than focusing on healing themselves).
172. See id. at 483.
173. See id. at 477.
174. See id. at 460–61.
175. See supra notes 163–69 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
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II. AN UNCERTAIN PURPOSE: DISCRETIONARY RELEASE AND THE
RELEVANCE OF VICTIM INPUT
The days of victims playing a peripheral role in the parole process as
passive witnesses are over. Not only is their level of participation
increasing,178 but as states proclaim how important victims’ voices are, an
increasing number of parole boards are incorporating victim input into their
release decisions.179 Currently, most states require their parole boards to
“consider” or “evaluate” victim input when they make release decisions.180
Such guidance leaves the parole board, an already nontransparent institution
with broad discretion,181 in the position of deciding how victim testimony is
relevant to the purposes of discretionary release.182 As a result, victim input
is assessed inconsistently—at times with alarming results for inmates,183 but
also for victims, who can be revictimized by unmet expectations.184 The
status quo fosters a system in which victims serve an ambiguous purpose, as
states fail to specify why they require boards to consider victim input. This
ambiguity prompts an even more important question: what purposes should
discretionary parole release serve more generally? The answer to this
question goes a long way to clarify how victim input may or may not be
relevant to the release decision.
Part II dissects the ambiguity surrounding the purpose of victim input in
parole by identifying four frameworks, drawn from theory and practice, to
understand parole release decisions. It then examines how each framework
accords varying degrees of importance to victim input. The frameworks have
certain explanatory power for what is happening in practice, a certain amount
of theoretical persuasion, or some combination of both. The frameworks are
not mutually exclusive, as each approach blends factors applicable to all,
except with different degrees of emphasis. These four approaches and their
corresponding treatment of victim input highlight the benefits and
consequences of each approach, which helps to frame how victim input
should be evaluated.

178. See Young, supra note 97, at 439.
179. See supra Parts I.C, I.D.2.
180. See Young, supra note 97, at 478–79. For example, in Colorado, the parole board will
“consider the totality of the circumstances, which include . . . [t]he testimony or written
statement from the victim of the crime, or a relative.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-404(4)(a)(I)
(2021). The same approach is found in New Jersey. See N.J. STATE PAROLE BD., THE PAROLE
BOOK: A HANDBOOK ON PAROLE PROCEDURES FOR ADULT AND YOUNG ADULT INMATES
47–48 (5th ed. 2012), https://www.nj.gov/parole/docs/AdultParoleHandbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J6MA-3XY9].
181. See supra Part I.A; see also supra Part I.B.2.
182. The panel of board members overseeing Herman Bell’s hearing stated that the
forgiveness by one victim was important but did not directly address Diane Piagentini’s
suffering as a consideration to deny parole. See Piagentini v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole,
176 A.D.3d 138, 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (Egan, J., dissenting).
183. See supra Part I.D.2.
184. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 371 (explaining that a negative consequence of
allowing victim input at parole is decreased levels of victim satisfaction if the true level of
victim influence over parole release decisions is less than a victim expected).
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Part II.A presents the most theoretically persuasive understanding of
discretionary parole release, which is that the release decision is primarily a
judgment on an inmate’s rehabilitation. Such an approach renders nearly all
victim input irrelevant.185 However, given that parole boards do consider
victim input, this theory lacks real explanatory power. Part II.B presents a
second understanding of parole release that, while an inmate must be
rehabilitated, the decision is also a judgment on whether the ends of
sentencing have been met, which makes victim input as relevant as it is at
initial sentencing. This theory, while perhaps more persuasive than the pure
rehabilitation approach, still lacks real explanatory power because data
shows that victim input exerts more influence on parole release than at
sentencing.186 Part II.C then presents a third framework for understanding
release in that it can also be a victim-centered decision, in which all victim
input is given significant weight because it is important itself. Then, a fourth
framework examines how practice reveals that the significance of victim
input may very well depend on whether a victim is sympathetic or not. Thus,
Part II.D posits that, in addition to rehabilitation, sentencing goals, and victim
preference, board members consider public sentiment when making
decisions, as release is inherently a politically accountable decision. In this
framework, victim input is relevant to the extent the victims are sympathetic
in the public’s eye.
A. Rehabilitation as the Key Determinant for Discretionary Release
The most common theoretical understanding of discretionary parole
release is that its fundamental purpose is to determine if rehabilitation has
been attained and to reward that achievement with release.187 In turn, parole
boards, in making release decisions, are concerned with “two principal
questions: does the prisoner represent a significant risk to the community,
and will his release on conditions promote his rehabilitation?”188 Parole
boards have a narrow mandate because, as Roberts articulates, “[f]rom
sentencing to parole, the justice system changes from one concerned with
retribution to one preoccupied primarily with risk and the rehabilitation of
the offender.”189
The idea is that, in an indeterminate sentencing regime, the parole board
should be bound by the sentencing judge’s determination that the minimum
sentence is long enough to meet those ends of punishment exclusive of
rehabilitation, such as retribution and deterrence.190 Under this framework,
the parole board should not deny release based on the belief that a longer
sentence is necessary on retributive grounds, but boards must instead focus
185. See id. at 385–86; see also Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 318.
186. See supra Part I.D.2.
187. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 31, at 16; see also supra Part I.A.
188. Roberts, supra note 120, at 385–86.
189. Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 318; see also Roberts, supra note 120, at 386 (stating
that “[f]rom sentencing to parole, the justice system therefore moves from consideration of
retribution into one preoccupied with risk and only latterly the rehabilitation of the offender”).
190. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 297.
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exclusively on evidence germane to an inmate’s ability to lead a crime-free
life if released.191 In other words, “[t]he inmate, not the crime, is at the center
of the inquiry,” as the determination is to what degree the inmate is
rehabilitated.192
This way of understanding parole is frequently reflected in statements
from parole boards, such as California’s Board of Parole Hearings, which
states that the “purpose of a parole suitability hearing is to determine whether
an inmate currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society if
released from prison.”193 In Virginia, the parole board website states, “The
Board’s mission is to grant parole or conditional release to those inmates
whose release is compatible with public safety.”194 In Ohio, the mission
statement is simple: “Reduce Recidivism Among Those We Touch.”195
Following the logic that rehabilitation is the key determinant for release, it
would appear victim input is almost never relevant, and therefore
insignificant, because it rarely, if ever, speaks to that concern.196 The rare
instance when victims might have pertinent information relevant to an
inmate’s rehabilitation is if, for example, they can demonstrate the inmate
has sent threatening letters to victims or otherwise engaged with them in
disturbing or inappropriate ways post-sentencing.197
However, since most boards encourage victims to discuss whatever they
think is relevant,198 victims almost exclusively and principally advocate for
denial of parole and detail their continued suffering from the crime—
information that is not germane to assessing the risk of recidivism.199 This
common type of victim testimony does not speak to the risk of reoffense an
inmate poses; as such, it would appear improper for boards to consider it as
a rationale for denying release under this framework.200
The result of this logic is similar to the reality detailed at California Board
of Parole hearings, in which victims participate in hearings and are told their
voice is important but, in reality, their input has no bearing on the release
decision.201 Thus, victims—if parole is understood as primarily concerned
with rehabilitation—are relegated to a purely expressive role, where their
voice has no impact on release (as opposed to an instrumental one, where it
191. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 352.
192. Young, supra note 97, at 438.
193. Information Considered at a Parole Suitability Hearing, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR.
& REHABILITATION, https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/parole-suitability-hearings-overview/
information-considered-at-a-parole-suitability-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/NE53-2BVN] (last
visited Sept. 17, 2021).
194. VA. PAROLE BD., https://vpb.virginia.gov/ [https://perma.cc/TJP7-W5G2] (last visited
Sept. 17, 2021).
195. OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR., https://drc.ohio.gov/ [https://perma.cc/WXX3MRDH] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
196. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 385–86; see also Young, supra note 97, at 485–86.
197. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 386; see also Young, supra note 97, at 438 n.25, 487.
198. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 388.
199. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 317.
200. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 392.
201. See supra notes 168–73 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between
instrumental and expressive roles for victims).
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does).202 Relegating victim input to an expressive role is based on the idea
that sharing one’s experience in a public setting can be cathartic and even
therapeutic for victims and inmates.203 However, not every parole hearing is
public, and victim input is often treated confidentially.204 This begs the
question: just how therapeutic is it for victims to relive a terrible experience
with a panel of board members they have never met before? Moreover, if
victims are assigned a purely expressive role at hearings, it would appear
victims are being deceived about the actual significance of their input given
victims are often assured that their opinion matters.205 This discrepancy
between messaging and reality can lead to further victimization because
victims suffer as a result of unmet expectations.206
While this approach is theoretically persuasive and in line with parole’s
conception, it fails to explain how decisions are made in practice because
victims are in many instances quite influential.207 If it really is all about
rehabilitation, victim input would be given no weight whatsoever and likely
would not be involved in the first place. This leads one to wonder: Are
boards routinely considering and acting on impermissible criteria when they
consider victim input? Or, is rehabilitation not the key determinant for parole
since release decisions are also a judgment of other important considerations?
B. Discretionary Release as a Resentencing Scheme
If parole boards in an indeterminate sentencing system are supposed to
work hand-in-hand with the sentencing judge to define an inmate’s true
period of incarceration,208 discretionary release can also be understood as a
quasi-judicial assessment of whether the ends of sentencing have been met.
Such an assessment not only requires, at a minimum, that the inmate is
rehabilitated but also embraces criminal punishment’s other ends: retribution
and deterrence.209 Retribution is the sentencing principle that “offenders
should be punished in proportion to their blameworthiness,” as defined “by
the nature and seriousness of the harm caused,” and their culpability.210 This
can serve as both a justification for and against punishment, as people should
not be punished any more or less than they deserve.211 Specific deterrence
is the sentencing principle that seeks to discourage the defendant from
reoffending by instilling fear of receiving a similar penalty in the future.212
General deterrence is the principle that, by instilling a fear of receiving a
202. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
203. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 384.
204. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 29.
205. See supra Part I.D.2.
206. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
207. See supra Part I.D.2.
208. See Slater, supra note 35.
209. See Bruce A. Green & Lara Bazelon, Restorative Justice from Prosecutors’
Perspective, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2287, 2291 (2020); see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES
MANUAL 1–2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
210. Richard S. Frase, Purpose: Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73 (2005).
211. See id. at 73–74.
212. See id. at 70.
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comparable sentence, an inmate’s period of incarceration must be sufficiently
long to discourage other would-be offenders from committing crimes.213
Understanding parole decisions as incorporating these elements of
sentencing, parole boards might be seen as well-situated to implement the
ideals of retribution and deterrence, as they potentially operate with more
knowledge of the inmate and the nature of the inmate’s crime than the
sentencing court did.214 The board has access to the inmate’s behavior
posttrial215 and potentially relevant information from a victim concerning the
impact of the crime.216 For example, if the parole board believes the
sentencing judge was too lenient and underestimated the long-term
consequences of the crime, the parole board could deny release to reflect a
fairer sentence, even if an inmate poses little risk of reoffense.217 In essence,
this approach embraces the idea that board members are able to put
themselves in the shoes of the sentencing judge and divine what the judge’s
decision would be if the judge had access to the information the board
members had.
Such an approach, however, is controversial because it may violate a
judge’s intentions about the sentence and the judge’s assumptions about the
board’s role.218 If a sentencing judge expects the parole board to engage in
retrospective sentencing when it has more information, there appears to be
no issue. However, if the sentencing judge believes release is presumed once
the inmate poses no crime risk, there can be real tension as the board could
violate the sentencing judge’s expectations of the proper sentence.219 Some
have even argued that permitting the board to entertain sentencing principles
is wrong, as it condones an administrative act performing a responsibility
properly entrusted to the judiciary.220
Further, there are concerns regarding the propriety of such a resentencing
scheme because, as an initial matter, board members are not judges, are often
less qualified, and have less legal experience.221 This might very well lead
to more parole denials based on deterrent or retributive motives, because
approaches to these principles can vary widely. 222 Lastly, some critics have
argued that if the sentencing decision is poor, the proper remedy lies not with
the parole board but with better sentencing procedures.223
It appears, though, that many states embrace something akin to this
approach for their parole system, as demonstrated by their assigning parole
213. See id. at 71.
214. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 31, at 19.
215. See id.
216. See notes 124–32 and accompanying text.
217. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 392; see also COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 31, at 19.
218. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 31, at 19; see also Roberts, supra note 120, at 392.
219. See Schwartzapfel, supra note 85 (describing how the Michigan parole board denied
release to an inmate for over thirty years, shocking the sentencing judge who presumed, when
crafting the inmate’s sentence, that the inmate would be released after his first hearing).
220. See id.
221. See supra Part I.B.1.
222. See Frase, supra note 210, at 70–74; see also infra Part III.B.2.
223. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 31, at 19.

814

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

boards the task of ensuring that release decisions are compatible with the
welfare of society and do not undermine the seriousness of the crime
committed.224 Indeed, board members nearly unanimously state that the
nature and severity of the underlying crime is a key factor in their release
calculus.225 In Virginia, for example, an appropriate reason for denial is the
nature of the crime, as defined by “the harm committed or caused to others,
the magnitude of the crime, and its impact on the victim and community.”226
Such a mandate seems to channel sentencing principles into parole
decision-making, as these considerations—nature and impact of the crime—
shed little light on the risk of reoffense.
The relevance and significance of victim input under this approach to
parole is similar to the relevance of victim input at sentencing.227 It is
important to note, though, that victims seldom influence sentencing
decisions, as judges are adept at ignoring evidence with no probative value,
such as a victim’s appeal for a more severe sentence.228 However, in the
parole context, victim input does matter to the extent that it sheds light on the
true long-term consequences of the crime and its corresponding severity;
those issues affect the degree to which retribution and deterrence are
necessary. How victim input influences the calculus depends on one’s
approach to meeting requisite retribution and deterrence.229 If the parole
board thinks the sentencing judge misinterpreted the true degree of the
victim’s suffering—and thus the severity of the crime—members can deny
parole to reflect the fact that the minimum sentence did not achieve
retribution proportionate to the impact of the underlying crime. 230 Further,
if a victim forgives an inmate or argues hardship might result from longer
incarceration because it prevents the offender from securing work to pay
restitution,231 such information would be relevant. This information points
toward release because it would reveal that the need for retribution on the
victim’s part has been achieved.232
Lastly, victims are typically not solicited for their opinions about how a
particular sentence will impact them,233 though some U.S. jurisdictions do
permit sentence recommendations from victims.234 Thus, if one understands
parole as a resentencing scheme, victim testimony is only relevant to the
224. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(A)
(McKinney 2021) (stating that an inmate’s release must be compatible “with the welfare of
society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for
law”); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.1099 (2021); COLO. CODE REGS. § 8–1511-1:6.01
(2021).
225. See RUHLAND ET AL., supra note 21, at 27–28.
226. About the Parole Board, VA. PAROLE BD., https://vpb.virginia.gov/about-the-paroleboard/ [https://perma.cc/S58U-X9UR] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
227. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 373–77.
228. See id. at 373–76.
229. See id. at 392.
230. See id.
231. See, e.g., id. at 376.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 389.
234. See id. at 358–59.
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extent it provides information regarding the crime’s actual impact. As
frustrating as it may be for victims, their desire for parole denial with nothing
else linking that desire to sentencing’s goals would not be considered by the
board because it would be considered irrelevant in this scheme.
While this framework possesses certain theoretical persuasiveness, the
inquiry does not end here. This framework fails to fully explain how parole
boards make decisions in practice because victim input is not only considered
for its probative value regarding proper sentencing. Instead, several parole
boards directly solicit victims’ personal opinions about how parole release
might impact them and whether they support release.235 Thus, one must dig
further and infer a third approach that has more explanatory power—an
approach that assigns great value and significance to victim input because it
should, itself, be considered important.236
C. Discretionary Release as a Victim-Centric Decision
Discretionary release decisions can also be understood as placing a high
value on victim input because board members, like much of the public, are
supportive of a criminal justice system that is responsive to and concerned
with victims’ unique needs. As the victim rights movement mobilized for
increased victim involvement in the criminal justice system,237 many parole
boards responded with well-intentioned efforts to encourage victim
participation and ensure victims that their voices mattered.238 Today, many
parole boards convey that victims are important and at the “heart” of the
release decision.239 This messaging reflects what appears to occur in practice
because victim participation is a significant predictor of parole denial in
many jurisdictions.240 While the old parole system may have detrimentally
excluded victims, some argue the modern system, by allowing victims to play
an instrumental role,241 may better help victims shed feelings of helplessness
during their offenders’ criminal proceedings.242 Under this approach, victim
input can legitimately exert direct influence on the release decision.
If one believes release should be attuned to victims’ interests, victim input
is significant and relevant regardless of what it conveys. Thus, even if a
board finds that an individual is rehabilitated and that the sentencing
principles of retribution and deterrence met, a board member may still deny
parole based on the victim’s needs and preferences. In Alabama, for
example, inmates are almost never granted release over a victim’s

235. See id. at 388–89; see also supra Part I.C.
236. See supra Part I.C.
237. See Erin Ann O’Hara, Victims and Prison Release: A Modest Proposal, 19 FED.
SENT’G REP. 130, 130 (2006).
238. See Young, supra note 97, at 478.
239. See id.
240. See supra notes 138–39.
241. See Mary Margaret Giannini, The Swinging Pendulum of Victims’ Rights: The
Enforceability of Indiana’s Victims’ Rights Law, 34 IND. L. REV. 1157, 1160–62 (2001).
242. See Morgan & Smith, supra note 112, at 336.
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objection.243 In New York, the parole board on some occasions has rescinded
parole, weeks after granting it, after victims expressed disapproval of not
being given an opportunity to be heard at the original hearing.244 The courts
have upheld such rescissions, so long as the victim input offered was
“significant” and “not known” by the board at the time release was
granted.245 In those cases, victim testimony concerned victims’ lingering
suffering.246 Although the law of parole rescission is not relevant to this
Note, such cases demonstrate that parole boards can effectively give victims
veto power, even if the parole board determined that release was acceptable
according to other criteria. However, in one case, with a familiar fact
pattern—release followed by victims protesting that they did not have an
opportunity to be heard at the hearing247—the New York Court of Appeals
reversed a parole rescission and ordered release but was careful to note that
the case “should not be interpreted as minimizing . . . the importance of
victim impact statements in parole board hearings.”248
Lastly, under this approach, it would appear that all victim input must be
treated equally, irrespective of whether the victim is sympathetic or able to
appear at a hearing, because not doing so would offend notions of equality
and fairness.249 Input from the family of a murdered gang member must be
accorded the same significance as input from the family of a murdered police
officer.250 Moreover, victims who are unable to attend a hearing—due to
illness or inability to travel or because the crime’s impact was so physically
or psychologically devastating that they are unable or unwilling to relive the
experience—must be afforded the same care and attention in the release
decision as those who can attend hearings. Otherwise, there is a possibility
that an inmate, who would have been denied release had a victim appeared,
could be released because a victim could not be present. This would result
in the unequal treatment of victims.

243. See Schwartzapfel, supra note 85.
244. See Benson v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 176 A.D.3d 1548, 1549–50 (N.Y. App. Div.
2019) (upholding parole rescission based on a victim impact hearing that occurred after the
release decision had been made because the mother and one brother of the victim offered new
evidence of the crime’s lingering impact on them, information that was not available to the
board when it made the original decision); Thorn v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 156 A.D.3d 980,
982 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (upholding rescission of release based on a subsequent victim
impact hearing in which three of the victim’s sisters and the victim’s brother-in-law offered
evidence not known to the board when it made the original decision, including that the inmate
had sent unnerving letters to one sister and made other threats to them when he was originally
sentenced); Pugh v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 991, 993–95 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)
(upholding rescission of a release decision based on the victim’s children’s distress regarding
the inmate’s lack of remorse, which constituted significant information previously unknown
to the board).
245. See Benson, 176 A.D.3d at 1549.
246. See id. at 1550–51.
247. See supra Part I.B.2.
248. Costello v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 23 N.Y.3d 1002, 1004 (N.Y. 2014).
249. See Robinson, supra note 113, at 757.
250. See id.
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However, it appears that the influence of victim input often depends on
whether victims appear at a hearing,251 give oral as opposed to written
testimony,252 or are sympathetic in the public’s eyes.253 This illustrates that
parole has perhaps strayed from the victim rights movement’s goal of equally
supporting all victims. The acknowledgment that victim impact can be
relative and may not be given consistent weight presents a fourth way to
understand parole release decisions—that release could be driven, in many
instances, by political considerations since parole boards are accountable to
the public.
D. Discretionary Release as a Political Decision
Release decisions can also be understood as political decisions that reflect
public sentiment. In fact, discretionary parole release has been described as
“in most instances, a political decision [because] parole board members are
typically political appointees sensitive to the emotional utterances of
victims”254 and to larger societal pressures.255 The fact that parole release is
attuned to public sentiment makes sense because members enjoy low
professional status, high job insecurity, and are offered little insulation from
public reprisals.256 Further, surveys have found that board members rate
political vulnerability and the pressure to minimize risk as their greatest
concerns257 because they are often held accountable for a single decision that
goes wrong, while hundreds of correct ones are glossed over.258 In general,
parole boards face grave political exposure when they take controversial
pro-release stances in closely watched cases, which often involve murdered
law enforcement officers, sympathetic victims, or particularly gruesome
crimes.259 Therefore, in these cases, the guiding principle is not

251. See Morgan & Smith, supra note 112, at 355–57.
252. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
253. Many controversial board decisions often concern releasing inmates convicted of
murdering police officers or committing sex crimes, whereas others generate less public
scrutiny. See Baker, supra note 8; see also Mike Bergazzi & Jon Burkett, Virginia Inspector
General Reviewing Controversial Parole Decision of Man Who Murdered Richmond Cop,
CBS 6 NEWS RICHMOND (May 8, 2020, 11:54 PM), https://www.wtvr.com/news/localnews/virginia-watchdog-reviewing-controversial-parole-decision-of-man-who-murdered-cop
[https://perma.cc/K8V6-CNSR].
254. James W. Marquart, Bringing Victims In, But How Far, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
329, 330 (2005).
255. See Schwartzapfel, supra note 85.
256. Reitz, supra note 36, at 2748–49.
257. See supra Part I.B.1.
258. See Reitz, supra note 36, at 2748–49 (describing this phenomenon as part of the “lore
of the field”); see also Schwartzapfel, supra note 85 (reporting that after a parolee killed a
policeman, five members of Massachusetts’s Parole Board were forced to resign and then
Governor Deval Patrick commented that “the public has lost confidence in parole”). After
this mass resignation, the discretionary release rate went from 42 percent to 26 percent. See
id.
259. See Schwartzapfel, supra note 85 (“‘You generally don’t get reappointed if you take
a controversial stand on a media case. And most cases involving law enforcement personnel
become media cases,’ said Thomas Grant, a former member of the New York parole board.”).
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rehabilitation, sentencing, or even being pro-victim but instead the
fulfillment of the public’s preferences.
This idea recently played out following the outcry over Herman Bell’s
release. Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, who was also convicted for the murder of
Officers Piagentini and Jones, was denied release in 2018, with the Board
declaring, “There is considerable community opposition to your release.”260
Professor Steven Zeidman speculated that the public outcry led the board to
deny release for Muntaqim.261 Interestingly, in New York, community
members’ input is not listed as a statutory factor that the board is directed to
consider under Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).262 Yet, courts in New York
have routinely held that the Board may consider input from individuals other
than those identified in the statute.263 For example, in Applewhite v. New
York State Board of Parole,264 the court rejected the petitioner’s argument
that the Board’s “consideration of certain unspecified ‘consistent community
opposition’ to his parole release was outside the scope of the relevant
statutory factors that may be taken into account in rendering a parole release
determination.”265 The court argued that community members’ opinions
could be considered by the Board even though they are not listed as factors
in the relevant statute because a separate portion of the statute—
§ 259-i(2)(c)(B)—protects the confidentiality of community members who
submit written input concerning an inmate’s potential release.266 The court
held that, by including this confidentiality provision, “the Legislature
demonstrated a clear intent that such opinions [from community members]
are a factor that may be considered by [the Board] in rendering its ultimate
parole release decision.”267
Such an approach to release can be defended on the grounds that the public
may hold certain wisdom regarding proper punishment. Perhaps community
members’ input should be considered for tough questions, such as whether
those convicted of murdering police officers should even be eligible for
parole.268 However, Professor Zeidman argued that board members should
not be influenced by the public, as such an approach turns the release decision
into a “popularity contest.”269

260. Gross, supra note 7.
261. See id. (discussing Professor Zeidman’s understanding of how the release process
played out in this instance).
262. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (McKinney 2021).
263. See, e.g., Jones v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 175 A.D.3d 1652, 1652. (N.Y. App. Div.
2019) (finding that “letters in support and in opposition to [the inmate’s] release” are relevant
factors to consider); Clark v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 531–32 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2018) (holding that “the Board permissibly considered letters in opposition to the parole
application submitted by public officials and members of the community”).
264. 167 A.D.3d 1380 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018), appeal dismissed, 32 N.Y.3d 1219 (2019).
265. Id. at 1381.
266. Id. at 1381–82.
267. Id. at 1382.
268. See Letter from Bill De Blasio, supra note 17.
269. Gross, supra note 7.
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“Popularity contest” may be an apt description for how victims fit into this
way of understanding parole release, as boards would decide which victims
are more deserving of influence based on their ability to garner the public’s
sympathy. In other words, the relevance of victim input strictly correlates
with the alignment of victims’ interests with the public’s. It is often the case
that these interests align, as victim rights groups have been successful in
capturing the public’s sympathy.270 This symbiotic relationship has resulted
in enormous pressure on boards to adopt a cautious disposition toward release
since victims and the public are broadly opposed to release.271
Conversely, victim input can be ignored entirely if victims cannot marshal
sufficient public sympathy for their cases. It may be easier for the family of
a slain police officer to gain public support and exert pressure on a board than
it may be for an unsympathetic victim to do the same.272
As Part II illustrates, there may be great discrepancies among board
members in how they approach the parole release decision and treat victim
input.273 This has resulted in a muddled mess in which victim input occupies
an ambiguous position and can be treated inconsistently among board
members depending on the framework board members adopt. Accordingly,
Part III recommends a solution to define the proper approach to the release
decision and victim input. Further, it recommends a more holistic approach
to the parole process so that it can work better for victims, inmates, and board
members.
III. PIERCING THE FOG: GUIDANCE FOR THE TREATMENT OF VICTIM INPUT
The Herman Bell case highlights the many unanswered questions
concerning how release decisions should be made and what victims’ role
should be. Rather than resolving these pressing questions, the current system
gives parole boards great discretion in their approach to victim input.274 To
make sense of this situation, this Note identified four approaches to
discretionary release to demonstrate the ways parole boards evaluate victim

270. See supra Part I.C.
271. See Schwartzapfel, supra note 85 (“‘The heavy pressure for being super conservative
is from your victims’ groups,’ said McVey, the Pennsylvania board chair . . . . ‘You’ve got a
very politicized victim community in the state of Alabama,’ which impacts the board’s
disposition towards release.”).
272. See Santos v. Brown, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 237 (Ct. App. 2015) (upholding
then-Governor Schwarzenegger’s commutation of the sentence of Esteban Núñez over the
objection of the murder victim’s family members, who did not receive notice and did not have
an opportunity to be heard before a decision was made). Esteban Núñez’s father was a
powerful Democratic assemblyman in California who had a warm relationship with
then-Governor Schwarzenegger, who said that his commutation was an act designed to help a
friend. See Laurel Rosenhall & Adria Watson, From Prison to the Halls of Power: A
Politician’s Son Lobbies to Let People on Parole Vote, CALMATTERS (June 22, 2020),
https://calmatters.org/projects/california-parolees-voting-rights-nunez-aca6/
[https://perma.cc/F75V-6NLY].
273. See also supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 53–63 and accompanying text; see also Medwed, supra note 33, at
508–09.

820

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

input.275 These approaches show the dramatically different options at board
members’ disposal, which, if left unguided, could lead to unmet expectations
and inconsistent decision-making. Left to their own devices, board members
might allow victim input to dominate the process, thus potentially resulting
in a higher denial rate.276
Accordingly, clarifying the approach parole boards should employ
requires balancing the benefits and consequences of involving victims.
Opening the doors of hearings to victims has had adverse consequences,
including putting board members in the untenable position of deciding how
to incorporate victims’ input and thus creating public distrust in the
process.277 Also, victim influence has unmoored parole from its roots as a
gauge of an inmate’s rehabilitation, leading to denials for otherwise
rehabilitated inmates and frustrating a core principle of indeterminate
sentencing—incentivizing rehabilitation.278 This situation has elicited
criticism, and there are many calls for excluding victims or limiting their
role.279 However, permitting victims to participate has positive outcomes:
victims can be genuinely heard, have their legitimate interests addressed, and
have their pain at least acknowledged, thus fueling greater trust in the
criminal justice system.280 Moreover, to bar victims completely from the
process or deny them any influence is wrong,281 as it has adverse
consequences of its own, such as secondary harm for victims who believe the
state has ignored them282 or, worse, has falsely promised them more
influence than they actually have.283 Striking a balance between no victim
participation and significant victim influence is critical for the future of a
well-functioning parole system. The proper purposes of the release decision
should be clarified, not left to the whims of an individual board member.
To this end, Part III recommends that discretionary parole release should
be treated both as a gauge of rehabilitation and as a resentencing scheme.
Accordingly, victim input should only influence the release decision if it
provides information, not emotion, showing either that the inmate is not
rehabilitated or that the judge’s minimum sentence did not accurately reflect
the impact of the crime and thus did not meet punishment’s retributive and
deterrent goals. If a victim’s testimony reveals, in the eyes of the parole
board, that either rehabilitation, deterrence, or retribution are not met, the
input should legitimately influence the release decision. That being said,
victims should be allowed to participate freely in the release process even
though their influence on the actual release decision is curtailed in the ways
275. See supra Part II.
276. See, e.g., Polowek, supra note 144, at 131–33; Morgan & Smith, supra note 112, at
336; Parsonage et al., supra note 136, at 193.
277. See supra Part I.D.2.
278. See Pisciotta, supra note 32, at 616–17.
279. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 384–85; Young, supra note 97, at 485–86; Rhine et
al., supra note 46, at 316–19.
280. See supra Part I.C.
281. See Young, supra note 97, at 482–83.
282. See SERED, supra note 111, at 30–31.
283. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 371.
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described above. Part III.A presents the rationale for treating the release
decision as a resentencing of sorts that gauges rehabilitation and the goals of
sentencing and the corresponding treatment of victim input such an approach
signals. Part III.B considers the implications of this recommendation and the
procedural changes required for its implementation in a consistent, fair
manner that does not trample the legitimate interests and expectations of
victims and inmates. Part III.C argues that, considering this Note’s proposed
solution, care must be exercised to avoid causing victims secondary harm,
and parole boards should think beyond the release-deny dichotomy as a
means for securing justice and ensuring healing for victims.
A. Information, Not Emotion: Limiting Victim Influence on Discretionary
Release
This Note proposes that parole boards should treat the release decision as
a gauge of rehabilitation and the goals of sentencing. Only information
offered by the victim that is pertinent to the question of an inmate’s
rehabilitation or the extent to which sentencing goals have been met should
influence the decision. This approach to discretionary release can lead to
more just, consistent, and impartial considerations of victim input than the
alternative approaches of treating the release decision as either a
victim-centered one or as one sensitive to the public’s needs.284 In addition,
this approach can better reap the rewards of a properly functioning
indeterminate sentencing scheme—fewer costs, less crowded prisons, and a
prison populace with a strong incentive to behave and reform.285
First, this Note embraces this more limited approach to victim influence
because granting or denying parole should be treated as a quasi-judicial act
based on law and fact.286 This profoundly important decision determines
how much longer an individual serves behind bars and should reflect the
same careful and impartial analysis required of a judge during sentencing.287
Board members must determine whether an inmate is sufficiently
rehabilitated to lead a crime-free life and should also consider victim input
regarding the impact of the crime, as society has an interest in enforcing
punishment proportional to the harm caused.288 If the parole board thinks
the sentencing judge misinterpreted the true degree of the victim’s
suffering—and collaterally the severity of the crime—it can deny parole to
reflect the fact that the minimum sentence did not achieve retribution
proportionate to the crime’s impact.289 Of course, permitting board members
to consider sentencing principles poses risks of its own.290

284. See supra Parts II.C–D.
285. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
286. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 280–81.
287. See id.
288. See Frase, supra note 210, at 68, 70, 75.
289. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 392.
290. The implications of permitting board members to consider sentencing principles are
addressed in infra Part III.B.2, which details the procedural adjustments that can be
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Second, victim influence on the release decision should be limited because
the criminal justice system should not necessarily be governed by the
victims’ needs. Just as a judge is generally adept at ignoring “extralegal”
material, like a victim’s opinion on punishment, and instead solicits
information about the crime’s impact to fashion a proper sentence,291 so too
should the board consider only information regarding an inmate’s risk of
recidivism and the true impact of the crime. Board members should not
consider the victim’s emotionally driven preference for a certain type of
punishment. While such an approach may appear callous to victims and
further sideline them in a criminal justice system that has historically and
wrongfully ignored victims,292 the fact remains that considering a victim’s
emotional desire for greater severity, or perhaps leniency, is inappropriate in
the parole release context. As Professor Susan Bandes rightly points out, it
is important not to equate the question of what victims need with the question
of what the legal system ought to provide.293 Victims’ interests need not
account for the wrongdoer’s rights and society’s interests; on the other hand,
the legal system must adequately account for fairness and due process, in
light of the high stakes and troubling but real possibility of error.294
The other approaches are simply inappropriate for parole. The approach
that posits that parole release could be understood as a victim-centric
decision295 and the approach that posits that victim preferences for parole
should be significant so long as they are sympathetic with the public296 are
inappropriate because they create a web of fairness concerns. In addition,
they frustrate the goals of establishing an indeterminate sentencing system in
the first place; these goals include: (1) reducing the financial costs of
incarceration, (2) addressing overcrowding in prisons, and (3) providing a
strong incentive for inmates to follow prison rules and achieve
rehabilitation.297
As many studies have shown, victim input can be afforded significant
weight if board members are left to evaluate it at their own discretion;298 yet,
only 10 percent of victims appear at hearings, raising concerns of unequal
treatment for similarly situated inmates.299 Similarly, it raises concerns of
unequal treatment of victims in that only victims who have the means to
attend hearings can have their preferences considered by board members,
whereas those who cannot, through no fault of their own, are ignored.300 The
implemented to prevent a parole board from being too focused on retribution or deterrence, as
it may be hard to place a meaningful cap on these goals.
291. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 374–76.
292. See HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 109, at 114.
293. Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of
Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1603 (2000).
294. See id. at 1606.
295. See supra Part II.C.
296. See supra Part II.D.
297. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
298. See supra Part I.D.2.
299. See Young, supra note 97, at 456.
300. See id. at 488–89.
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idea that release decisions—and thus the criminal justice system’s evaluation
of the importance of a victim’s suffering—can turn on a victim’s ability to
attend a hearing or timely submit an impact statement seems arbitrary
because it will lead to unjustifiable discrepancies, a result that is unfair to
inmates.301 Given these troubling realities, the release decision should
instead be guided by a holistic analysis of inmates’ behavior and the impact
of their crimes.
Further, affording victim input significant weight can frustrate the
rationale of establishing an indeterminate sentencing system. This approach
often results in release denials for otherwise rehabilitated inmates because of
a victim’s compelling testimony.302 Additionally, permitting board members
to significantly consider victim input can discourage inmates from involving
themselves in the parole process. Studies show inmates postpone or even
waive their own parole hearings altogether when they learn a victim will
attend because they fear that the hearing will be a “fait accompli.”303 Thus,
rather than working out their own salvation as indeterminate sentencing
imagined,304 inmates instead can be easily disillusioned with the process
when the extent of victim influence is not properly cabined.
Finally, the approach that posits that victim input can be treated as more
or less influential based on the public’s sympathy for a particular victim305
poses equally disturbing complications. As Professor Zeidman rightly puts
it, such an approach transforms the parole system into a popularity contest.306
Moreover, it is unsustainable to approach parole release in such a manner, as
it would discriminate among victims, further harming victims already
alienated by the public’s failure to see their suffering as legitimate.307
Allowing the public’s preference for the victim’s personal interests to be a
legitimate consideration for boards is no way to sustainably run a fair and
impartial parole system.
While the criminal justice system should be more accommodating to
victims, the parole hearing is one place where the law should not determine
outcomes based on the victim’s preference. Board members—who preside
over a powerful instrument of the justice system—must remain cognizant of
inmates’ rights and should make decisions based on the best information
available, not necessarily the very real and legitimate emotionally driven
needs of victims. Society has an interest in ensuring that proper, not
disproportionate, punishment is meted out. Therefore, victims should have
301. See id. (“In two identical cases, one victim may show up and the other may not;
allowing the victim’s presence or absence to affect a releasing decision introduces an
arbitrariness into the decision-making process that may unfairly disadvantage certain
inmates.”).
302. See supra Part I.D.2.
303. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 317–18; see also notes 143–44 and accompanying
text.
304. See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 31, at 15.
305. See supra Part II.D.
306. See Gross, supra note 7 (describing Professor Zeidman’s understanding through an
interview).
307. See supra Part II.D.
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limited influence on the release decision, and their input should only affect
the decision if the information they provide addresses issues of rehabilitation
or proper punishment.
However, permitting board members to second-guess a judge’s sentence
and cabining victim influence is not without controversy. It will require
adaptation. There must be procedural and structural changes to parole release
to put this approach into effect in a fair and consistent manner.
B. The Procedural Implications of Defining Victim Influence
Regardless of how one thinks victim input should be evaluated, there is
one procedural change all can agree with: states must codify the purposes of
parole release so relevant parties can understand beforehand how victim
input will be evaluated. This section presents the procedural implications of
limiting victim influence according to this Note’s resolution.
1. States Must Codify the Purposes of Parole Release
As a threshold matter, even if one disagrees with the position that parole
boards should permit victim input to influence the release decision in limited
circumstances, the fact remains that board discretion must be channeled in
some articulable way so that the board’s treatment of victims meets a
legitimate purpose. Whichever approach to victim input is adopted,308 there
must be regulation or legislation clearly articulating that standard. A factor,
like victim input, should serve a predetermined purpose, and the decision
about how to incorporate that factor should not be left to board members, as
practice reveals their approaches can vary considerably.309 If board members
are not provided guidance beforehand, they will continue to apply disparate
standards. It will be too easy for them to overvalue victim input because they
may be quite empathetic toward emotionally charged victim testimony.310
Alternatively, board members might improperly undervalue victim input if
they personally think victims should have no say.311 Accordingly, even if
there is disagreement about the level of influence victims should have, all
should agree that, at a minimum, state legislatures must codify which
approach or theory of parole release governs. Parole boards must be
transparent regarding the approach they apply so that all can understand the
extent to which victim input will factor into the board’s decision. Not doing
so can expose victims to secondary harm through unmet expectations312 and
cause inmates to question the legitimacy of the process,313 diminishing both
groups’ trust in the criminal justice system. If states allow victim input to
308. See supra Part II.C.
309. See supra Part I.D.2.
310. See supra notes 149–53.
311. See BURKES ET AL., supra note 70, at 17–18 (finding that one board member disagreed
and one strongly disagreed that victims offer valuable input); see also Young, supra note 97,
at 473.
312. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 371.
313. See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
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influence decisions only when it relates to rehabilitation or the goals of
sentencing, there are additional procedural implications that the states must
take into account. These are addressed below.
2. Procedural Implications of Limiting Victim Influence
Changes to the parole release process must be enacted if a state wants to
ensure that victim input is applied in a manner consistent with this Note’s
recommendation. First, states must require higher qualifications for board
members and afford them greater protections from public or political reprisal
to ensure they are sufficiently capable of performing their quasi-judicial task.
Second, board members must justify their release decisions through reasoned
analysis, much like judges. Third, there must be a real opportunity for
judicial review of these decisions to ensure due process is met. Without these
procedural changes, parole boards’ natural tendency toward caution could
lead to a crush of denials based on deterrent or retributive motivations.314
First, the qualifications required of board members are insufficient given
the complex nature of the work board members perform. 315 Coinciding with
this lack of requisite expertise and credentials, board members suffer from
political vulnerability and can be removed easily.316 Thus, if board members
are expected to evaluate rehabilitation and the satisfaction of sentencing
goals, they must have expertise similar to that of a judge and must be
insulated from nonstatutory considerations such as political, public, or other
pressures. If one allows board members to second-guess a sentencing judge’s
minimum sentence, such second-guessing must come from a similarly adept
and independent decision-maker.317 Thus, qualifications must be similar to
those required for judges. To insulate board members from improper
pressures, some states use a nonpartisan panel of individuals with law
enforcement and criminal defense backgrounds to recommend appointments
and work with the governor to nominate board members.318 Another option
is to use for board members the same process used for the selection and
removal of judges.319
Second, states must require board members to be forthcoming in their
rationales. One-line explanations, or even no explanations at all, for release
decisions is inadequate,320 especially if a board member is denying release
314. See Schwartzapfel, supra note 85 (documenting many cases where parole boards are
overly cautious and deny release to individuals who pose little risk of recidivism).
315. See supra Part I.B; see also Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 286.
316. See Reitz, supra note 36, at 2750 (likening parole boards to “sitting ducks” when a
decision goes wrong).
317. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 280 (“[P]rison release decision[s] should be
approached with the same care and consideration given judicial sentencing.”).
318. See id. at 288–89. Hawaii, for example, relies on nominations forwarded by a panel
comprised of the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, the president of the Hawaii
Criminal Justice Association, and the president of the Bar Association of Hawaii, among other
similarly capable nominators. Id. Utah draws its nominees from its Commission on Criminal
and Juvenile Justice. Id.
319. See id. at 289.
320. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
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based on what the board member believes was an incorrect minimum
sentence. It is more difficult for board members to be arbitrary and
inconsistent in their rulings if they must defend their decisions with facts and
evidence. Thus, board members, if permitted to entertain principles of
sentencing must transparently explain how the victim input was not available
to the sentencing judge or was improperly overlooked at sentencing, such
that the true severity of the crime was miscalculated. Investment is required
to enable board members to engage in such thorough decision-making if it is
to be comparable to a sentencing decision.321 Currently, there are too few
board members, and decisions are often made in mere minutes, which shows
just how rushed they can be.322 Thus, states must hire more parole board
members to allow for such a reasoned decision-making process. With
committed resources, this approach can prevent board members from being
overly focused on retribution or deterrence, as their opinions will have to
show that the sentencing judge made a mistake—a serious claim to make.
In addition to counteracting a board that might overvalue deterrent or
retributive principles, requiring a judicial-like opinion for release decisions
can also better protect board members from negative public reaction and
reduce feelings of disillusionment among victims 323 and inmates324 when a
decision goes against their wishes. Requiring board members to publicly
explain how their decisions comport with the letter of the law, while not a
panacea for those who disagree with the decision, will at least show that these
decisions are not arbitrary or inherently unfair and can promote better
understanding among the affected parties. Currently, the black box nature of
parole does not offer board members any protection, as the public may
struggle to have faith in an institution which can be nontransparent.325
Requiring thorough opinions can counteract negative perceptions of
discretionary release.
Third, parole board decisions must be subjected to legitimate appeal and
review in the state court system; such an appeal process is currently not
available in some states.326 This reform requires written board opinions, as
well as transcripts of proceedings, to be maintained, as meaningful review of
release decisions is hindered by the absence of these key records.327 Thus,
having written opinions and transcripts available can subject decisions to

321. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 312 (discussing that “greater institutional investment
is needed” so that “adequate attention” and “good substantive decision making” can be applied
in every case).
322. See Medwed, supra note 33, at 510; Reitz, supra note 36, at 2750 n.26.
323. See Roberts, supra note 120, at 371.
324. See supra Part I.D.2.
325. See supra notes 53–62, 100–02 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text; see also COHEN & GOBERT, supra note
31, at 21 (describing judicial review of the merits of release decisions as, while technically
available, essentially a fruitless exercise).
327. See Rhine et al., supra note 46, at 315 (“Oversight of any kind is hindered by the
absence in many states of transcripts or verbatim records of parole proceedings and the general
absence of requirements of reasoned explanations for decisions.”).
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more meaningful appellate review.328 This can then provide a check on
board members to ensure they are following the statutory criteria and
producing sufficiently transparent and consistent release decisions.
While this Note recommends limited victim influence on the release
decision and advocates for procedural changes that would allow parole
decisions to better attain that goal, there must also be procedural changes that
safeguard victims from further harm and allow their interests to be heard.
C. Assuring Procedural Justice for Victims
While it is important for the parole release process to be fair and impartial
for all parties, it is equally, if not more, important that the release process
treats victims and their interests with care and does everything possible to
avoid causing them secondary harms.329 While this Note proposes an
approach to parole release that would limit the extent victims can influence
the actual release decision, it nonetheless advocates for a process that is
attuned to victims’ needs and argues that parole boards should move beyond
the release-deny dichotomy as a means to aid victims in their healing.
First, the discretionary release process itself must be fair to victims if board
members are going to ask for their participation. States should incorporate
principles of procedural justice when they tailor their processes so as to
reduce the potential for secondary harms to victims.330 According to
proponents of procedural justice, victims can be satisfied with a criminal
justice process, like parole release, even if they do not agree with the
outcome, so long as they believe that the parole release process is fair.331 To
develop a trustworthy process, victims should be allowed to discuss what is
important to them with the parole boards; however, the parole board must
display its neutrality and be honest with the victim regarding the way they
will factor the victim’s input into the release decision.332 Further, parole
boards must afford victims dignity and respect, rather than deceiving them
about the functioning of the process.333
As a result, states should reflect the true relevance of victim input on the
release decision in their public messaging and in their guidelines. Implying
victim input lies at the heart of the decision process—when it may or may
not be334 or only does 10 percent of the time335—deceives victims about the
actual treatment of their input.336 Such an approach cultivates secondary
harm if a release decision goes against the victims’ wishes. For example, if
this Note’s recommendations were applied to Herman Bell’s case, perhaps
Diane Piagentini, while almost certainly still disagreeing with the outcome,
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

See id.
See SERED, supra note 111, at 30–31.
See generally Giannini, supra note 116.
See id. at 85–104.
See id. at 90–91.
See id.
See supra Part I.D.2.
See Young, supra note 97, at 456.
See id. at 490.

828

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

might have been less harmed by the decision, had the Board been
forthcoming about the weight her input would be afforded. Instead, the
Board cited the testimony of what was likely some members of Officer Jones’
family337 as compelling and neglected to mention Diane Piagentini at all.338
It is not hard to see how she might view this outcome as unfair and as an act
of secondary victimization, as it may have rightly appeared to her that the
New York Board of Parole chose to value another victim’s preference over
hers with no explanation.
While parole boards should be truthful with victims regarding the weight
and role of their input, parole boards should also permit unrestrained access
to the hearings if a victim so desires. Rather than provide victims an
instrumental role, parole boards should be clear with victims that their role
at hearings is entirely expressive unless the information they provide speaks
to an inmate’s rehabilitation or shows that the sentencing minimum did not
accomplish certain sentencing goals. Though affording this transparency
might be uncomfortable, a victim’s expectations will at least not be
manipulated even if their role is smaller than they would have wished; as
scholar Kathryne Young notes, “honesty and legitimacy go hand in hand.”339
Further, if boards only permit victim input to have a limited influence, parole
boards should discuss the benefits and drawbacks of reliving the experience
in a public setting with a victim beforehand.340 Additionally, to better realize
the therapeutic and cathartic potential inherent in victim expression, parole
boards should improve hearings for the victims that choose to attend.341
Parole boards should consider offering mental health support for victims who
make the decision to submit testimony concerning what could be one of the
most haunting and significant moments of their lives.342 In the same vein,
hearing times should be longer than twenty-minute conveyor-belt-like
sessions.343
Finally, parole boards should abandon the notion that a victim’s needs or
interests can or should be satisfied only by granting or denying parole. Parole
boards should not link caring for victims with denying parole, as that is
simply unsustainable for the health of both the system and the victim. It may
prevent healing for victims because they focus on protesting at parole
hearings and have a deep emotional attachment to getting denial for their
offenders, instead of “moving on” with their lives.344 Moreover, it is
unsustainable because an inmate may still be released, causing real anguish
for the victim who has so much emotionally invested in the outcome. Instead,
337. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
338. See Piagentini v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 176 A.D.3d 138, 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)
(Egan, J., dissenting).
339. See Young, supra note 97, at 490.
340. See id.
341. See id. at 490–92.
342. See id. at 492.
343. See Medwed, supra note 33, at 510; Reitz, supra note 36, at 2750 n.26.
344. See Young, supra note 97, at 476 (commenting that some board members felt victim
participation prevented the victim from “moving on,” as they would dwell on their anger and
be consumed by it).
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board members should care about how victims will feel about release—not
for purposes of deciding whether release is just, but for purposes of
supporting the victim after the fact. Perhaps parole boards should invest in
greater counseling and health services for victims as they are often the
primary, if not the only, point of contact between victims and the criminal
justice system after sentencing.345 In addition, parole boards, given their
unique position as a conduit between victims and inmates, can facilitate more
restorative justice models of healing by providing the option for Victim
Offender Mediation (VOM),346 which has had promising results in
promoting victims’ well-being.347 States should empower parole boards to
move beyond linking victim interests with parole release decisions and look
to other more sustainable ways to address their legitimate needs and interests.
CONCLUSION
As the use of discretionary parole release increases, questions about
victims’ role in the process persist. These questions often center on the
general purpose parole release serves, as the level of influence victim input
has is often dictated by a particular board member’s approach to the release
decision.
This Note identified four ways that parole boards approach release
decisions. Under the first theory, parole boards may primarily focus on
rehabilitation and thus assign little to no importance to victim input. This
theory lacks explanatory power because victims do exert incredible influence
in reality. Under the second theory, parole boards may treat the release
decision as a resentencing decision that is concerned with considering the
retributive and deterrent principles of punishment. This theory does not
explain how victim testimony is often outcome-determinative. Under the
third theory, release is a victim-centric decision. This theory also falls short
of explaining how release decisions are made because it appears that, to some
board members, some victims matter more than others. Under the fourth
theory, parole decisions are political decisions that reflect public sentiment
about victims’ input.
All of these frameworks present benefits and drawbacks. Some are
theoretically persuasive, while others have real explanatory power—or a mix
of both. In addition, there is the overarching question of whether victim input
345. See id. at 492.
346. Over a thousand VOM centers have been opened in the past decade, enabling victims
and offenders to meet in person to discuss the crime and its impact. See O’Hara, supra note
237, at 131. VOM has been described as successful in both reducing recidivism rates among
inmates and increasing satisfaction among victims who felt their opinions were heard and who
were able to finally receive a genuine apology and public reckoning for the crime’s effects on
them. Id. Though, much of VOM’s success could be a product of the fact that its participants
are selectively screened. Id.; see also supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing a
VOM process in Minnesota).
347. See O’Hara, supra note 237, at 131 (“[T]hose who instead opt for VOM are
significantly more likely to report that their opinions were considered, the outcomes were fair
and satisfactory, and the offender was held accountable.”).
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should be a factor. On one hand, permitting victim input poses fairness
concerns for inmates; on the other hand, shutting victims out of the process
can also lead to adverse consequences.
This Note attempts to strike a balance between these extremes and posits
that board members should evaluate inmates’ rehabilitation as well as the
extent to which sentencing’s retributive and deterrent goals have been met.
Thus, victim input should only influence the release decision if it provides
information showing either that the inmate is not rehabilitated or that the
judge’s minimum sentence did not accurately reflect the impact of the crime.
Recognizing the implications of this approach, this Note proposes stricter
requirements for board member qualifications and explanation of decisions.
Additionally, states should tailor release procedures to minimize the risks of
secondary harms to victims. States should give victims the opportunity to be
heard, but they must be truthful about the weight victims’ input is afforded.
Finally, states should empower parole boards to move beyond the
release-deny dichotomy as the principal means to aid victims in their healing.

